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RESUMEN
Este ensayo examina la ambigüedad que envuelve a organizaciones 
sin fines de lucro que implementan programas contra la pobreza en el 
contexto de reformas neoliberal. A pesar de la imagen positiva que las 
convirtió en una alternativa ideal al desacreditado Estado benefactor, 
investigaciones recientes sobre organizaciones sin fin de lucro exponen 
la ambigüedad política de sus intervenciones: Algunas contribuyen al 
bienestar general y el cambio social, mientras que otras adelantan for-
mas de gobernanza y ejercicios de poder neoliberal. Esta ambigüedad 
requiere que la investigación sobre organizaciones sin fines de lucro 
examine, y no asuma, la relación entre la misión de bienestar que rec-
laman las organizaciones y los efectos concretos de sus intervenciones 
sociales. Este ensayo contribuye a esta línea de investigación crítica 
sobre organizaciones sin fines de lucro mediante un estudio de caso de 
una organización nacional que implementa proyectos antipobreza en 
Puerto Rico: Acción Social de Puerto Rico, Inc. (ASPRI). El estudio 
discute las reformas políticas que llevaron a que los programas an-
ti-pobreza de ASPRI se entrelazan con la nueva lógica de gobernanza 
neoliberal. El estudio expone el desfase entre las metas de bienestar de 
ASPRI y los efectos de sus programas en la población servida. El estu-
dio desmitifica la presunción a priori de las virtudes del sector sin fines 
de lucro sobre el Estado benefactor.  [Palabras  clave: sin fin de lucro, 
neoliberalismo, desarrollo comunitario, políticas de empoderamiento].
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ABSTRACT
This essay examines the ambiguity encompassing nonprofit organi-
zations implementing anti-poverty programs in the context of neolib-
eral reforms.  Despite the “do good” image that made them an ideal 
alternative to the discredited welfare state, research on nonprofits in 
the context of neoliberal reforms has exposed the political ambiguity 
underlying their actual effects: Some contribute to wellbeing and so-
cial change, while others further neoliberal forms of governance and 
power. This ambiguity demands that research on nonprofits examines, 
rather than assume, the relation between the “do good” claims of this 
sector and the actual effects of their social interventions. This essay 
builds on and contributes to this critical approach to nonprofits through 
the case study of a nation nonprofit organization engaged in anti-pov-
erty community development in Puerto Rico: Social Action of Puerto 
Rico, Inc. (ASPRI, for its acronym in Spanish).  The study discusses 
the policy reforms that led ASPRI’s long-standing anti-poverty pro-
gram to become entangled with the logic of neoliberal governance. 
By questioning the assumed transparency between ASPRI’s “do good” 
claims and the effects of its programs on the population served, this 
study demystifies the assumed virtues of the nonprofit alternative to the 
welfare state.  [Keywords: nonprofit sector, neoliberalism, community 
development, empowerment politics].
10            Revista de CienCias soCiales 28 (2015)
______________________
...
Doing good or just as bad? ...
Introduction: nonprofits, neoliberalism and the cloud of 
political ambiguity
The statist reforms inaugurated in the 1980s by the Reagan and 
Thatcher administrations were predicated on both, a critique of public 
welfare systems and an exaltation of the virtues of nonprofit organiza-
tions in supplying basic needs and promoting socio-economic change.1 
This anti-welfare state stance, which congealed into a reformist agenda 
known as neoliberalism, blamed the public safety net for bloating the 
public bureaucracy, ingraining a rigid and inefficient managerial system, 
and promoting a centralized, paternalistic welfare model that drained the 
public treasury, and trapped people in a web of dependence and stifled 
private initiative (Harvey, 2005).  In contrast, nonprofit organizations 
were praised for their managerial flexibility, smaller size, fiscal efficien-
cy, and apolitical orientation, which avoided corruption and political pa-
tronage (Grønbjerg & Salamon, 2002).  Also, nonprofits were celebrated 
for their local reach, social capital formation and participatory models 
that promoted collective empowerment.  Thus, the nonprofit sector 
emerged in the post1980s era as a “do good” sector; an image that made 
it an ideal alternative to the discredited welfare state.
However, research on nonprofits in the context of neoliberal re-
forms soon revealed the ambiguity underlying their actual performance 
and results. To be sure, some studies in the United States (U.S.) and 
Latin America confirmed their positive contributions to socioeconomic 
wellbeing and political empowerment (Fisher, 1998; Salamon, 2002). 
Yet, ethnographic research on community development nonprofits in 
Brazil, Bolivia and India (Chernela 2005; Gill, 1997; Sharma, 2006) 
exposed their collusion with neoliberal reforms, which favored new 
forms of governance and power that incorporate non-state actors and 
work through empowerment politics (Li, 2007). These studies show 
how nonprofit interventions serve to manage and control impoverished 
populations, despite their social change claims. The accumulation of 
these mixed reviews led William Fisher to conclude: “There is no sim-
ple or consistent story of good NGOs confronting evil governments…
the NGO field is a heterogeneous one encompassing a wide range of 
groups with different ideological agendas” (1997, p. 452).  In other 
words, the sector’s “do well” image has obfuscated the fact that non-
profits can advance diverse and often competing political projects: 
from alternative grassroots initiatives to neoliberal reformist agendas. 
Thus, researchers need to explore, rather than assume, the relation be-
tween the sector’s “do well” claims and the actual effects of their social 
interventions.
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This ambiguity of nonprofits in the context of neoliberal reforms 
was the point of departure of my research into nonprofits engaged in 
community development in contemporary Puerto Rico. Following the 
post1980s global trends, Puerto Rico has undergone a series of neolib-
eral reforms that privatized public corporations, revoked protectionist 
tariffs, eliminated jobs in the public sector, reduced work-related ben-
efits, slashed public budgets, and knocked down the social safety net, 
among others (Bonilla & Boglio Martinez, 2010; Colón, 2005, Pratts, 
1996).  These reforms have been presented as necessary to reinvent a 
Puerto Rican state burdened by an ineffective bureaucracy, insufficient 
fiscal resources, and widespread dependence on its welfare programs 
(Santana Rabell, Santiago Centeno, & Rivera Ortiz, 2007). 
Consistent with the global neoliberal narrative, the island’s non-
profit sector has been invoked as a necessary contributor to this re-
formist agenda, especially in the areas of welfare dependence and 
community change. Public sector reforms included the call for a new 
form of democratic governance in which the State shares the respon-
sibility for securing public goods with a network of actors, including 
nonprofits (Santana Rabell, Santiago Centeno, & Rivera Ortiz, 2007). 
In this new form of governance, nonprofits either substitute or collabo-
rate with public and private for-profit agencies in the delivery of social 
services and the promotion of community change. Unsurprisingly, the 
local nonprofit sector has undergone a dramatic growth since the 80s: 
64% of all registrations of nonprofits in the island occurred between 
1981 and 1999 (Díaz Olivo, 2000, p.728). This process has intensified 
since then: on average 2,500 new organizations were registered be-
tween 1999 and 2003. 
The island’s neoliberal reforms have generated an enormous re-
search literature, yet the role of the nonprofit in those reforms has not 
been carefully examined. The literature on nonprofits is limited by the 
lack of critical assessments of the political ambiguity of the sector in 
the context of neoliberal reforms identified in the international liter-
ature. Comprehensive studies of the island’s “Third Sector,” such as 
those produced by Estudios Técnicos (1996, 2002, 2007), reproduce 
its “do good” image by selectively exalting the contributions of this 
sector to the local economy and to the wellbeing of its population. A 
few other important studies examine the success of emblematic initia-
tives, of the proposed democratic governance, carried out in the Penín-
sula de Cantera and the municipality of Caguas (Pratts, 2013; Rivera 
Grajales, 2006; Santana Rabell, Santiago Centeno, & Rivera Ortiz, 
2007). However, there is a shortage of studies interrogating wheth-
er the performance of specific nonprofits lives up to their “do-good” 
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claims or how they collude with neoliberal governmentality. Migdalia 
Camacho Hernández (2009) offers a literature review of the nonprofit 
sector in the island and highlights this gap when she argues that the 
alleged virtues of this sector, such as its local reach, altruistic mission 
and social capital formation, have not been empirically proven. One 
noticeable exception is a study by Rubén Estremera Jiménez focused 
on the much praised Peninsula de Cantera project. Estremera Jiménez 
(2007) critiques the desencuentros (mismatches) between the claims 
of community empowerment and self-management and its actual im-
plementation. According to his research, the project is plagued by the 
clash “between the wellbeing of the community and the interests of 
those that promote capital accumulation (2007, p. 124, translated to 
English). 
This essay seeks to redress the dearth of critical research in Puer-
to Rico linking the nonprofit sector to neoliberal reforms. It does so 
through the study of a Puerto Rican nonprofit engaged in anti-poverty 
community development:  Social Action of Puerto Rico, Inc. (ASPRI).2 
The study locates ASPRI, its community development program, and 
its main funding source—the Community Service Block Grant--within 
the broader neoliberal reforms undergone by the U.S. and P.R. since the 
1980s. This historical sketch traces the continuities and ruptures of an-
ti-poverty policies and programs resulting from U.S. welfare reforms, 
which trickled down to Puerto Rico. These continuities and ruptures 
configure an ambiguous political context in which the long-standing 
anti-poverty and community development programs offered by ASPRI 
become entangled with the logic of neoliberal governance. By ques-
tioning the assumed transparency between the “do good” claims of 
ASPRI and the effects of its programs on the population served, this 
study demystifies some of the assumed virtues of the nonprofit alterna-
tive to the welfare state.  
Methodology
This essay presents the finding of an ethnographic case study 
of ASPRI conducted between 2008 and 2010 as part of my disserta-
tion research on grassroots support nonprofits promoting community 
change in contemporary Puerto Rico.3 ASPRI’s selection was the result 
of a purposive sampling strategy (Russell Bernard, 2011, p. 145) that 
identified local nonprofits relevant to my research interests: Organi-
zations conducting grassroots support work, operating nationally, and 
having direct connections to post1980s policy reforms in the United 
States and Puerto Rico.  After consulting with the Department of Fam-
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ily, which manages most federal anti-poverty programs, and searching 
the Directory of Nonprofit Organizations compiled by the Non-Profit 
Evaluation & Resource Center, Inc., I preselected possible candidates 
and proceeded to contact them. ASPRI was one of the organizations 
identified that agreed to participate in my research. 
Examining the indeterminacy of nonprofits in our current neo-
liberal context required an in-depth research study that justified the 
choice of the ethnographic case method, which is suited for labor-in-
tensive studies of nonprobability samples (Rusell Bernard, p. 143). 
Also, my goal of contributing to a critical reassessment of nonprofits 
in Puerto Rico benefits from the case study’s emphasis on generating 
understanding of complex phenomena. According to Chadderton and 
Torrence (2011), case studies “privilege in-depth inquiry over cover-
age: understanding ‘the case’ rather than generalizing to a population” 
(p. 54). Presenting a detailed case study that offers a critical under-
standing of nonprofits in Puerto Rico is of more value at present than 
issues of generalizability due to the paucity of similar studies. How-
ever, my findings are relevant to the sector as a whole since the eth-
nographic case method produces knowledge of issues and problems at 
a smaller scale that are relevant to larger scale theoretical discussions 
(Chadderton & Torrence, 2011,, p. 54). 
The ethnographic case method allowed me the flexibility to ex-
pand the boundaries and strategies of research analysis beyond AS-
PRI’s institutional setting and long-term participant observation. I fol-
lowed Lisa Markowitz’s (2001) application of social network analysis 
to NGOs. Thus, my analysis locates ASPRI at the center of a complex 
social network that links a disparate set of actors, ranging from federal 
funding agencies, local state administrators, and community groups. 
Finally, I applied Dorothy Smith’s (2005) methodology on institutional 
ethnography that requires the discursive analysis of systems of ideas, 
such as models, policies and mission statements, which shape the orga-
nization’s political orientation and its program effects. 
From the war on poverty to servicing impoverished 
communities: the community services block grant 
Social Action of Puerto Rico, Inc.’s incorporation in 1982 as a 
nonprofit was motivated by U.S. welfare policy changes early in the 
1980s, specifically the replacement of anti-poverty programs autho-
rized under the War on Poverty‘s Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) 
of 1964 with the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG). ASPRI, 
then, is not one of those nonprofits that emerged as a grassroots initia-
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tive seeking to voice the concerns of some community group. Instead, 
ASPRI belongs to that subset of nonprofit organizations created in re-
sponse to the U.S. federal government’s restructuring of its welfare 
policies. Analyzing the policy context in which ASPRI emerged is im-
portant because, as Migdalia Camacho Hernández argues, the political 
relationship between nonprofits and the state reflects “the historical, 
cultural and political moment that serves as its context” (2009, p. 60). 
In other words, the role and function of nonprofits vis-à-vis state proj-
ects varies depending on the historical juncture in which they occur. 
Thus, understanding the political orientation of ASPRI’s anti-poverty 
initiatives requires examining the reformist policy context in which it 
emerged and in response to which it developed its mission.
The Community Services Block Grant was authorized by the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, which consolidated 77 EOA an-
ti-poverty programs into 9 block grants (P.L. 97-35, 1981).4 CSBG re-
placed eight EOA categorical programs that addressed a broad range of 
issues: from food and nutrition and services for seniors to youth sports 
and community economic development. Despite replacing some of its 
programs, CSBG retained the EOA’s main purpose: the amelioration 
of poverty and its causes. Ironically, this retention contrasts with Pres-
ident Reagan’s plan to eliminate the EOA, a legislation that marked 
the most significant expansion of the welfare state since the New Deal. 
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 resulted in a major restruc-
turing of the welfare state that undermined the principles and commit-
ments promulgated by President Johnson’s War on Poverty. This act 
constituted the initial stage of a conservative, cost-cutting reformist 
era that changed the manner in which the federal government funded 
anti-poverty programs and collaborated with nonprofit organizations 
(Nemon, 2007). 
The legislation called for CSBG funds to be channeled through 
Community Action Agencies (CAAs), a network of public and pri-
vate organizations previously responsible for implementing EOA pro-
grams, such as the Community Action Program (CAP).  CAP was an 
innovative program that, according to Howard Nemon, “marked the 
first time that the federal government directly sponsored and financed 
community organizations on a large scale to carry out federal policy” 
(Nemon, 2007, p. 7). CAP funds resulted in an unprecedented part-
nership between the federal government and nongovernmental orga-
nizations to combat poverty.  Interestingly, CAP was one of the EOA 
programs replaced by CSBG. Thus, CSBG continues the tradition of 
state-nonprofit collaborations established by CAP and retains a key 
aspect of the War on Poverty’s strategy for combating poverty. There-
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fore, CSBG does not represent a shift from publicly operated programs 
to publicly funded programs operated by nonprofit organizations. In-
stead, CSBG maintains the federal government’s historical collabora-
tions with CAAs even though the Reagan administration substituted 
the programs that gave rise to those collaborations.
However, CSBG altered the manner in which the federal govern-
ment related to CAAs. Under the EOA, funding flowed directly from 
the federal government to CAAs.5 By contrast, CSBG funds now flow 
first to state agencies which, in turn, are responsible for disbursing 
them to CAAs. Under CSBG, states assume new administrative re-
sponsibilities, which included monitoring agencies, providing techni-
cal assistance, and conducting audits. These expanded roles require 
new administrative structures and personnel, which increased state 
costs, only a portion of which (up to 5%) were covered by CSBG. 
Thus, CSBG transferred both funds and administrative responsibilities 
to states, which resulted in a reduction of the federal government’s 
administrative roles over CSBG. 
CSBG’s reliance on intermediary state agencies exemplifies the 
shift to devolution that characterized President Reagan’s New Fed-
eralism (Finegold, Wherry & Schardin, 2004). States’ authority over 
grant management has been greatly expanded under this model of fed-
eral-state relations. The block grant format gives states much needed 
flexibility to attend the local causes of poverty. However, devolution 
was about much more than just empowering state agencies.  Block 
grants provide a fix financial award to states and CAAs that does not 
necessarily match the total award required if financial resources were 
distributed to all recipients who qualified based on need or right to ben-
efit (ibid.). Block grants eliminate de facto the concept of categorical 
entitlement, that is, an individual’s rights to benefits. Thus, the new 
state-mediated, block grant model for funding CAAs ultimately pur-
sues the elimination of federal guarantees to impoverished populations 
and the reduction of federal welfare spending and responsibilities. 
CSBG did in fact receive less total funding than the eight pro-
grams it replaced. In 1981, the Community Services Administration, 
the office that managed EOA programs, received $525 million dollars 
to fund the anti-poverty, community action programs it administered. 
The following year, CSBG received $350 million to cover basically 
the same programmatic areas, which represents a 34% budget cut. This 
budget remained fairly consistent until the mid-1990s and only in 2005 
did CSBG funds matched the pre-1981 funding level of the EOA pro-
grams it substituted (Nemon, 2007).   
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The reduction in CSBG funds translated to fewer funds for CAAs, 
which compensated that loss by expanding the number of federal and 
state programs they administrated. A longitudinal analysis of CAAs 
finances demonstrates this expansion. In 1986, CSBG funds account-
ed for 17% of the total budget of the CAAs surveyed (United States 
General Accounting Office, 1986, p. 18). The report also indicates that 
CAAs ran other federal programs, such as Head Start, Community De-
velopment Block Grants and Low Income Home Energy Assistance. 
Including these programs, federal funds accounted for 89% of CAAs 
total budget, which points to an almost complete dependence on fed-
eral funding for their operation (p.18). By contrast, a similar study 
carried out in 2005 revealed that CSBG funds accounted for only 6% 
of CAAs’ total budget, while federal funds accounted for 63%, state 
programs 11% and local government funding 7% (Power et al., 2006). 
These ratios display the continued dependence of CAAs on govern-
ment funds, but also show a significant reduction of federal funds in 
CAAs’ budgets, which is consistent with welfare spending reduction 
goals underlying CSBG’s authorization. 
The need to secure financial support led CAAs to expand the num-
ber of state and local government programs they ran. This expansion 
eventually transformed these agencies into grant managing, social 
service delivery organizations. Most CAAs from the 1960s were in-
corporated by community leaders and social welfare professionals as 
part of a grassroots support system that promoted citizen participation 
and community-based initiatives to reduce the causes of poverty. To be 
sure, CAAs have dealt with the tension between community empow-
erment and social service delivery since their inception. Yet, at present 
CAAs have fallen prey to the neoliberal trend that has watered down 
nonprofit activism and distanced them from grassroots social change 
politics by incorporating them into a reformed social safety net that at-
tends to, but does not overcome, existing inequalities. Thus, for CAAs 
the transition from CAP to CSBG funds transformed them from a com-
munity action network to a social welfare delivery network. 
This increased emphasis on social service delivery is an effect of 
ideological transformations in the U.S. federal government’s anti-pov-
erty policies. According to the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, the 
purpose of CAPs was to “provide stimulation and incentive for urban 
and rural communities to mobilize their resources to combat poverty 
through community action programs” (P.L. 88-452). CAPs called for 
the maximum feasible participation of residents of impoverished areas 
in the planning and implementation of solutions to their socioeconomic 
problems. The insistence on citizen participation reflected a commitment 
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to combine government resources with citizen empowerment as a neces-
sary approach to overcoming poverty. As such, CAP represented a clear 
effort by the federal government to promote a participatory development 
model as a solution to the nation’s lingering problems with poverty. 
However, President Reagan’s 1981 Omnibus Act changed this 
proactive stance towards poverty into a conservative, social services 
orientation. The substitution of the Community Action Program by the 
Community Services Block Grant exemplifies this change. This shift 
was facilitated by a politically ambiguous concept adopted by CSBG 
from the EOA legislation: self-sufficiency. In the context of the EOA 
legislation, self-sufficiency was part of a progressive reform that made 
poverty a prominent issue on the public agenda. Also, the federal gov-
ernment backed its call for greater self-sufficiency with an investment 
in public programs that increased the opportunities of impoverished 
populations to move into the workforce. By contrast, the 1981 legisla-
tion re-signified the concept of self-sufficiency to convey a critique of 
citizen dependence on welfare assistance.  The goal was not so much 
citizen empowerment as the reduction of welfare rolls. CSBG’s call for 
self-sufficiency did not receive the financial support needed for the ed-
ucational, training and service programs required to help people re-en-
ter the workforce. Thus, CSBG stands as an example of the capacity of 
neoliberal reforms to absorb existent community-based, empowerment 
programs and re-signify them in alignment with its anti-welfare cri-
tique.  This new vision trickled down to CAAs implementing CSBG 
and made them social service agencies. 
A community action agency in Puerto Rico’s social welfare 
history: social action of Puerto Rico, Inc. 
ASPRI emerged precisely at the historical crossroad in which 
President Reagan’s New Federalism and anti-welfare reforms were 
undermining categorical programs and citizen entitlements, reducing 
federal welfare funding, restructuring federal-state-nonprofit relations 
through block grants and re-orienting their anti-poverty stance to a 
more conservative social service model.  This ideological and political 
context left an indelible imprint on the political orientation of ASPRI’s 
anti-poverty mission and programs. Ultimately, ASPRI’s entanglement 
with this reformist agenda through CSBG funding resulted in its ab-
sorption into the nonprofit arm of the neoliberal governmental appa-
ratus in P.R.     
In its first year of incorporation, ASPRI was classified as an eligi-
ble entity, a CAAs, to implement community programs under the Om-
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nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. Thus, ASPRI’s incorporation 
constitutes a local response to the federal government’s welfare reform 
that created a new anti-poverty program, CSBG, whose funds were 
available to nonprofit agencies. To be sure, federal programs funded 
local nonprofit organizations prior to 1981. As in the U.S., CAP funds 
were used by Puerto Rico’s local Office of Economic Opportunity to 
partially finance a number of nongovernmental initiatives. Yet, AS-
PRI’s incorporation in response to CSBG funding points to changes in 
local state-nonprofit relations. First, CSBG’s substitution of CAP had 
different implications for the Puerto Rican state than for the nonprofit 
sector. For the public sector, CSBG represented a reduction in federal 
funds and the elimination of important categorical anti-poverty pro-
grams that addressed many of the population’s pressing needs. By con-
trast, the nonprofit sector, especially recently founded agencies such 
as ASPRI, found in CSBG a welcoming funding source on which they 
could rely to finance their operations. 
ASPRI’s recruitment of its administrative staff resulted in the 
transfer of social welfare professionals from public agencies to a non-
profit one. For example, ASPRI first Executive Director had served 
previously as a program assessment consultant and Executive Director 
of the Division of Community Education (DIVEDCO) between 1978 
and 1981. DIVEDCO was a public community-based educational 
agency which interestingly received CAP funds until their replacement 
by CSBG (Pérez Quintana, 1984). Other DIVEDCO employees also 
joined ASPRI, including administrative personnel still employed at 
the agency in 2009 at the moment of my research, most notably the 
agency’s Community Development Program Director and one of its 
Evaluation and Monitoring assistants. Furthermore, DIVEDCO’s new 
Executive Director in 1982 established a collaborative agreement with 
ASPRI that assigned DIVEDCO employees to ASPRI to work together 
in community development projects.  
Anthropologist Leslie Gill confronted a similar personnel shift be-
tween state agencies and NGOs in Bolivia and interpreted it as a mecha-
nism through which neoliberal politics drift to the nongovernmental sector: 
NGOs are increasingly accepting the burden of poverty allevia-
tion from retrenching and decentralizing state agencies. Personnel 
regularly circulate between them and state agencies. They are thus 
situating themselves within the context of state policy and the pa-
rameters of neoliberalism (1997, p. 146). 
The movement of administrative staff from DIVEDCO to ASPRI to 
pursue similar community initiatives demonstrates the political ad-
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justments made by social welfare professionals under an emergent re-
formist policy context. Moreover, it illustrates the personal linkages 
through which neoliberal reforms diffuse beyond the public sector and 
integrate nonprofits into their restructured political network. 
ASPRI embodies the social service orientation towards poverty 
reduction advanced by the CSBG legislation and assumed by most 
CAAs in the U.S.  Contrary to other CAAs founded in the 1960s, AS-
PRI was not founded by grassroots leaders engaged in social change 
community efforts. Instead, it was founded by social welfare profes-
sionals with vast experience in public community development pro-
grams that did not promote adversarial tactics to achieve their goals. As 
such, ASPRI is not a nonprofit organization created as an instrument 
of empowerment and social struggle by a marginalized community. 
In fact, the role and participation of community members in ASPRI is 
reduced, like in most current CAAs, to a cosmetic, proportional repre-
sentation—one third—in its Board of Directors (Nemon, 2007).6  
As a Community Action Agency, ASPRI is expected to implement 
programs that offset the causes and consequences of poverty. Yet, one 
of ASPRI’s main service programs consists of administering adult day 
care centers throughout the island for people under the poverty line. In 
these centers, ASPRI provides food, medical check-ups, recreational 
programs, and assistance with multiple issues, from dealing with social 
security or Medicare to intervening with family problems. While these 
are important services for an elderly population with scarce resources, 
they certainly do not advance the cause of eradicating poverty, which 
is CSBG’s and, by default, ASPRI’s alleged mission. The same can be 
said about some of its other programs. ASPRI offers an emergency as-
sistance program, which provides medical supplies to underprivileged 
elderly who have an immediate need. In the early 1980s, ASPRI also 
ran an employment program geared towards helping people secure a 
job, mostly through employment subsidies. Like most CAAs, ASPRI 
also received funds from other federal programs, such as the Emergen-
cy Community Services for the Homeless Program (ECSHP). In all, 
these programs denote a commitment to working with impoverished 
populations facing challenging life circumstances. However, service 
delivery and subsidies have proven incapable of altering the conditions 
that gave rise to these problems or even redressing their deep-seated 
problems.  
Under its current Executive Director, who began in 2001, the 
agency has incorporated new programs, such as an after-school tutor-
ing program and a music program for school-age children and youth. 
The agency also developed a formal structure for its community de-
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velopment program. Unlike its other programs, these seem to address 
some of the fundamental causes of poverty: education and political 
organization (community boards). These programs suggest ASPRI can 
operate as a grassroots support organization offering a set of support 
interventions targeting the principal causes of poverty. Yet, the success 
of these programs has been limited to determining their effectiveness 
in generating changes in client attitudes and practices. While this is 
necessary, success in combating poverty depends on mobilizing and 
re-directing public and private resources towards impoverished popu-
lations, a challenging and potentially contested political project that is 
absent from these programs.  
ASPRI’s commitment to a service delivery approach is best demon-
strated by its reliance on the Family Development Model to design 
and implement its diverse programming. Conceptualized for CAAs by 
the federal government during the mid-1980s, this model proposes a 
comprehensive service delivery approach that “utilizes intensive case 
management to help families assess their barriers to self-sufficiency 
and then create a plan for escaping poverty” (Nemon, 2007, p. 13). 
This model was devised to provide uniformity to the disparate ser-
vice delivery approaches that resulted from the flexibility offered by 
CSBG to CAAs in the formulation of local programming. Of course, 
the delivery of multiple, coordinated services to impoverished popu-
lations are recognized as an essential component of anti-poverty pro-
grams. However, the Family Development Model re-centered CSBG’s 
unit of intervention from communities to families. It also changed the 
intervention approach from community action to case management. 
As such, this model represents a movement away from the communi-
ty empowerment approach present in the EOA legislation and which 
CSBG allegedly continued. 
ASPRI has extended its family case management approach to all 
of its programs, including its community development program.  The 
agency’s current Community Development Program Coordinator jus-
tified this move during an interview: 
We now focus more on family case management, although we still 
do some community work. Previously, community development 
focused more on communal problems, such as streets and infra-
structure. But, the problem is that people are no longer interested 
in getting involved. The community is not as relevant a unit as the 
family. That is where people’s interests lie.7 
The Family Development Model has refocused the community de-
velopment program’s effort from local infrastructure development and 
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communal mobilization to family case management. This shift was 
motivated by the need to comply with the federal guidelines that pro-
moted that model. Nevertheless, ASPRI’s Community Development 
coordinator justifies this change alleging that the central category of 
her development program, community, has lost some of its power to 
compel people to action in contemporary P.R. This despite ample evi-
dence to the contrary, such as recent communal mobilizations against 
waste disposal projects, questionable renewable energy initiatives 
and attempts to privatize beach access. Moreover, the justification es-
poused poses a devastating critique to the program, particularly to its 
continued efficacy or even need. Community has become an empty 
concept kept alive only in ASPRI’s mission statements and program 
titles to comply with CSBG. 
Ultimately, ASPRI stands as a concrete example of a Community 
Action Agency that has molded its operation to fit CSBG’s conserva-
tive social service approach.  Like CSBG, ASPRI retains the EOA’s 
language of poverty reduction, community-based participation and 
self-sufficiency in agency documents. However, ASPRI’s programs 
and service model define it as a grant managing, service delivery orga-
nization that functions much more as a safety net cushioning the symp-
toms of poverty than as a grassroots support organization committed 
to rattling the foundations of inequality. While it provides essential 
resources and services to impoverished communities, these are ulti-
mately inadequate for the dismantling the structural barriers separating 
low-income communities from income security and wealth creation. 
The “do good” claims on trial: ASPRI as a case study of the 
nonprofit alternative 
Nonprofits have emerged as ideal alternatives to the public welfare 
system because of their claim to greater managerial flexibility, fiscal 
efficiency, and apolitical orientation. ASPRI’s performance in relation 
to these fundamental neoliberal premises will be examined in order 
to determine if it constitutes a viable alternative to the welfare state. 
The analysis focuses on three key issues: Has contracting with ASPRI 
avoided the politicization of anti-poverty interventions? Is ASPRI less 
prone to corruption? Does ASPRI offer greater administrative and ser-
vice-delivery flexibility through innovative initiatives? 
Political Neutrality
Critiques of the entanglement of party politics with state agencies 
have served to legitimize state subcontracting of nonprofits. The public 
sector’s susceptibility to party politics introduces rent seeking and vote 
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maximizing considerations that often derail the delivery of services 
to those most in need. By contrast, the nonprofit sector’s purported 
distance from party politics helps it avoid these pitfalls. However, AS-
PRI’s history contradicts somewhat this argument. The general per-
ception of ASPRI among social welfare professionals, politicians and 
community activists is that ASPRI’s incorporation was promoted by 
the New Progressive Party’s (PNP, for its acronym is Spanish) admin-
istration to gain access and control of CSBG funds. As evidence, most 
people interviewed recalled that ASPRI’s first Executive Director was 
a government official under Governor Romero Barceló and left public 
office to incorporate ASPRI. Moreover, ASPRI remained closely asso-
ciated with DIVEDCO, the Executive Director’s previous employer, 
until 1984 when Romero Barceló lost the general election to the Popu-
lar Democratic Party (PPD, for its acronym is Spanish). 
This partisan association was so pervasive that the new PPD ad-
ministration tried to deny ASPRI access to CSBG funds. However, 
since CSBG funds were earmarked for ASPRI the government could 
not re-distribute those funds at will. The administration curtailed that 
problem by promoting the incorporation in 1986 of another CAAs, the 
Instituto Socio-Económico Comunitario (INSEC), in order to re-direct 
CSBG funds to an agency with close political ties to them. ASPRI’s 
Executive Director sued the government in an attempt to avoid losing 
the CSBG funds. This contentious legal battle led to a compromise in 
which ASPRI and INSEC split the CSBG funds, with ASPRI receiving 
39% and INSEC 32%.8 Thus, a political dispute over the control of 
CSBG funds created an anomalous situation. First, two CAAs co-ex-
isted in the same jurisdiction offering similar programs, a situation ac-
tively avoided by CAAs elsewhere.9 Second, party politics, not sound 
social policy, determines each agency’s funding rates. In that sense, 
ASPRI does not represent an alternative institutional space untainted 
by politics, but rather stands as one more space to which party politics 
has been transferred in P.R. 
ASPRI’s current Executive Director claims to have distanced the 
agency from its alleged partisan connections. Yet, she too represents a con-
tinuation of that association since she served as Director of the Gericulture 
Commission under the Romero Barceló administration. Moreover, ASPRI 
retains its partisan association in the popular imaginary. During my visits 
to community projects, veteran leaders asserted ASPRI’s historical linked 
to the PNP. Finally, ASPRI’s Board of Directors has historically limited its 
inclusion of public officials to political figures associated with the PNP, 
such as Guaynabo’s Mayor Hector O‘Neill, Salina’s ex-Mayor Basilio 
Baerga, ex-Senators Lucy Arce and Néstor Aponte. 
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Administrative and Service-Delivery Flexibility 
Despite what its nonprofit status might suggest, ASPRI’s adminis-
trative decisions are subject to financial considerations. ASPRI has ser-
vice contracts with several municipal governments and regional con-
sortiums, most of which have PNP connections: Bayamón-Comerío, 
Mayagüez-Las Marías, Dorado-Manatí, and the municipalities of Vega 
Alta and Cayey.10  Unsurprisingly, ASPRI has translated its historical 
political connections to service contracts. However, the bulk of its op-
erating budget comes from CSBG funds, which in 2008 totaled $10.8 
million.11 Financial dependence carries with it important consequences 
for nonprofit organizations, such as potential conflicts between donor 
demands and their service population’s needs. ASPRI’s dependence on 
CSBG funds obligates it to comply with the federal government’s fis-
cal demands and subjects the agency to the policy changes resulting 
from the different ideological bearings of every new administration.
ASPRI’s dependence on CSBG is reflected in the fact that its stra-
tegic plan and programs are limited to CSBG compliance activities. 
The agency’s 2006-2008 Action Plan consisted of a detailed outline of 
six national goals (Acción Social, 2006): 
Table 1: National Goals of the Community Services Block 
Grant Program
Goal 1 Low-income people become more self-sufficient (self-sufficiency)
Goal 2 The conditions in which low-income people live are improved (community revitalization)
Goal 3 Low-income people own a stake in their community
Goal 4 Partnerships among supporters and providers of services to low-income people are achieved. 
Goal 5 Agencies increase their capacity to achieve results
Goal 6 Low-income people, especially vulnerable populations, achieve their potential by strengthening family and other supportive systems.(family stability)
For each goal, ASPRI developed a set of performance indicators, insti-
tutional strategies and activities, and outcome measurements. 
These national goals are not original or even locally specific since 
they were developed in 1994 by a CSBG federal monitoring and eval-
uation committee with input from the Office of Community Services 
and the Department of Health and Human Resources. These goals were 
created to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act 
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(GPRA) of 1993, which imposed strict guidelines for the fiscal mon-
itoring of all federally-funded programs. The CSBG legislation was 
amended in 1994 to include the above six national goals, their perfor-
mance targets and outcome measures, all of which have been adopt-
ed by ASPRI. Finally, CAAs were required to integrate the use of the 
Results-Oriented Management and Accountability (ROMA) system, a 
tool developed to evaluate whether CAAs are meeting their intended 
results. 
Both GPRA and ROMA represent an important shift in the way the 
federal government administered its programs. According to Callahan 
and Holzer (1999), GPRA and ROMA were part of President Clinton’s 
government reforms which attempted to redress the growing critiques 
of government inefficiency, over-spending and lack of accountability. 
These reforms moved the federal government away from compliance- 
to results-based assessments. This shift represented a new phase of 
neoliberal restructuring in which the previous welfare state’s reliance 
on social welfare professionals to determine a program’s need or effi-
cacy was substituted with evaluation tools and compliance guidelines 
that privilege financial considerations.  This substitution is not unique 
to the U.S.  Nikolas Rose’s analysis of the forms of governance devel-
oped by so calls “advanced liberal democracies” makes explicit men-
tion of this approach: 
The powers once accorded to positive knowledge of human con-
duct are transferred to the calculative regimes of accounting and 
financial management...The enclosures of expertise are to be pen-
etrated through a range of new techniques for exercising critical 
scrutiny over authority—budget discipline, accountancy and audit 
being three of the most salient (1996, p. 54).  
GPRA and ROMA are textbook examples of this wave neoliberal 
reforms that scrutinize the cost-efficiency of anti-poverty interventions 
and emphasize budgetary considerations over process and human con-
duct expertise. 
ASPRI’s strategic plan and programming are geared specifical-
ly to comply with CSBG’s national goals and ROMA requirements. 
ASPRI’s current Executive Director and Sub-Director acknowledged 
during an interview that the agency limits its goals and programs to 
those prescribed by CSBG. ASPRI’s over determination by CSBG’s 
requirements belies the contention that nonprofit organizations have 
greater administrative flexibility and are more responsive to local 
demands than state agencies. ASPRI only uses federally-recognized 
service models and discards implementing programs whose outcomes 
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cannot be translated into statistical results. Also, ASPRI’s compliance 
with federal requirements curtails its innovative potential. 
ASPRI’s case study undermines the idealization of nonprofit or-
ganizations as “do good” alternatives to state agencies. ASPRI func-
tions as an appendage of the state facilitating the neoliberal reform of 
the federal welfare system. ASPRI translated both President Reagan’s 
conservative welfare reform and President Clinton’s fiscal account-
ability measures into concrete administrative processes and program 
that changed how services were offered to impoverished populations. 
Moreover, ASPRI’s continual renewal of CSBG funds depends not on 
its innovative capacity and flexible administrative structure, but rather 
on its capacity to deliver the services and accountability measures de-
manded by the federal government. Ironically, ASPRI even contradicts 
the critiques of neoliberalism which posit that nonprofits are under-
mining the state. Instead, as Aradhana Sharma has noted for NGOs 
in India, nonprofits like ASPRI find themselves entangled “within the 
webs of governance as instruments and not just targets of rule” (2006, 
p. 78). ASPRI is a prime example that while the federal government 
might have downsized since the 1980s, its authority was not complete-
ly undermined or transferred. 
Nonprofit Corruption  
The federal governments’ tightened fiscal oversight initiated under 
the Clinton administration led to a corruption investigation that uncov-
ered a number of embezzlement schemes by ASPRI administrators. An 
audit report submitted by P.R.’s public accounting inspector found that 
between 1990 and 1995 ASPRI administrators “deprived ASPRI of the 
timely use of [CSBG funds] for the purposes for which they were as-
signed, which were, among others, offering services to agency clients, 
such as elderly and low-income populations” (Oficina del Contralor de 
Puerto Rico, 2001, p. 9, my translation). The principle ASPRI admin-
istrators signaled by this report were Flor de María Cacho, Executive 
Director; Mr. Waldermar Pérez, Sub-Director; Mr. Catalino Soto, Le-
gal Advisor; Mrs. Paulina Colón, Personnel Supervisor; and Mr. Juan 
de la Torre Sánchez, Internal Auditor. 
According to the audit report, in 1988 Mrs. Cacho and Mr. Pérez 
incorporated another nonprofit organization, the Center for Education 
and Community Services, Inc. (CECSI), without securing the consent 
of the Board of Director or informing the Department of Family, which 
manages the CSBG grant (p.9). They used CECSI as a front to car-
ry out a series of embezzlement and fund misappropriation transac-
tions that cost ASPRI and their clients millions of dollars. One of the 
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schemes consisted of paying CECSI inflated prices for food bought for 
ASPRI’s served population. Under the direct orders of Mrs. Cacho, 
CECSI employees purchased food from various distributors and later 
re-sold them to ASPRI at prices that exceeded the original by twenty to 
thirty percent. According to the audit report, between October of 1990 
and September of 1995, the agency paid CESCI $1,851,003 for the 
alleged purchases. (p. 6). 
Mrs. Cacho and Mr. Pérez used a similar scheme to purchase med-
ical supplies for ASPRI’s clients. The money diverted to CESCI was 
used by Mrs. Cacho and Mr. Pérez to purchase bank certificates, which 
generated interests. These certificates and their interests were used to 
get loans to cover ASPRI’s overdrafts and as collateral for credit lines 
for CESCI. More significantly, these funds were used for personal 
gains, such as paying of personal debts, buying cars, acquiring real 
estate properties, clothing, perfumes and vacation trips ( p. 8). Employ-
ees involved in the scam also benefitted by receiving monthly com-
pensations that fluctuated between $150 and $300. The total amount 
embezzled by these schemes was close to $5.8 million in federal aid 
money. 
As a result of these and other irregularities identified by both state 
and federal investigations, on July 16, 1997 a Federal Grand Jury found 
probable cause to accuse Mrs. Cacho and Mr. Pérez of the five charges 
(pp. 6-7): Conspiracy to Commit Theft from a Program Receiving 
Federal Funds; Theft from a Program Receiving Federal Funds; False 
Statement on an Application for a Bank Loan; Frauds and Swindles; 
and Criminal Forfeiture. In August of 2000, Mr. Pérez was found guilty 
of four charges, while Mrs. Cacho was found guilty of all five. Both 
served prison time for their corruption schemes. 
The audit report also faulted ASPRI’s Board of Directors and the 
Department of Family for failing to monitor and evaluate ASPRI’s fi-
nancial and administrative operations. In the case of the Board of Di-
rectors, the audit report found that the absence of regular meetings and 
the presence of ASPRI’s Legal Advisor impeded the Board from ef-
fectively monitoring ASPRI’s administrators and their financial opera-
tions (p.13). Paradoxically, the President of the Board of Directors kept 
his post throughout this legal ordeal and still presided over it in 2009. 
After Mrs. Cacho’s resignation in August of 2000, ASPRI went 
through a short period of court-mandated syndication that ended in 
2001 with the hiring of a new Executive Director. Under this new Ex-
ecutive Director, ASPRI has complied with all federal requirements 
and has slowly regained the confidence of both state and federal agen-
cies.  One of the Department of Family’s program evaluator assigned 
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to ASPRI expressed in an interview that ASPRI had overcome its past 
corruption scandal and was currently complying with all monitoring 
requirements. 
The personal failures of ASPRI’s administrators should not be 
used to characterize the agency or the nonprofit sector. However, AS-
PRI’s corruption scandal demonstrates that despite being managed 
by a group of experienced and educated professionals, nonprofits are 
not immune to embezzlement schemes. This case problematizes the 
aura of not-for-profit social commitment that supports the sector’s “do 
good” image. In fact, Puerto Rico’s government accounting inspector 
published a report on fraud in nonprofit organizations that exposes not 
only the prevalence of these acts, but also identifies vulnerabilities that 
are specific to nonprofits (Oficina del Contralor, 2005, pp. 1-2): 
•	 An atmosphere of extreme confidence due to the labor they car-
ry out 
•	 Excessive control of the organization by the founder, a director 
or a specific contributor 
•	 The absence of personnel with financial experience in the Board 
of Directors 
•	 Limited funds assigned to operational and accounting areas 
ASPRI met many of these conditions. Its administrators took advan-
tage of these vulnerabilities to defraud not only the federal govern-
ment, but the population in need of those resources.  
The claim that nonprofit organizations are more trustworthy and 
impervious to corruption than public agencies because they are mis-
sion-driven organizations not motivated by profit-seeking interests is 
based on a spurious assumption. ASPRI’s experience demonstrates that 
funding agencies need to establish strict monitoring procedures, sim-
ilar to those imposed to any public agency. Moreover, ASPRI’s case 
example undermines the uncritical acceptance of the nonprofit sector 
as an alternative, do-good sector that would help the state avoid the 
politicization of services, public-fund embezzlements and ineffective 
bureaucracy. 
Conclusion 
Our current political era has witnessed a qualitative change in 
the manner in which states, markets and nonprofits are articulated. 
The analysis of both CSBG and ASPRI documents precisely how 
state-nonprofit relations, common during the height of the welfare state 
era in the 1960s, gained a new momentum since the 1980s as a result 
28            Revista de CienCias soCiales 28 (2015)
______________________
...
Doing good or just as bad? ...
of the federal government’s restructuring of its welfare state.  To be 
sure, ASPRI’s mission statement and federal financial support maintain 
important continuities with previous welfare programs. Tracing these 
historical linkages is necessary because they shift the analysis from 
characterizing the newness of state-nonprofit relations to examining 
their transformation across changing political eras. 
However, policy contexts and party politics matter for the kinds of 
social welfare interventions that are possible at any given time and in 
any organizational context. CSBG’s and ASPRI’s analysis showed how 
decades-old mission statements, participatory initiatives and state-non-
profit collaborations became politically ambiguous in the context of 
neoliberal reforms. The intersection of liberal anti-poverty and devel-
opment politics with contemporary neoliberalism has produced what 
Sue Kenny (2002) calls a “fused discourse”: The activist framework of 
engagement and self-determination has been entangled with individu-
alistic notions of self-determination and resilience in the market frame-
work (p. 296).  The policy changes that gave rise to CSBG and ASPRI 
were motivated by Reagan’s conservative, anti-welfare state ideology, 
but made use of concepts and appealed to commitments formulated 
during the liberal, public welfare era of the 1960s.  Thus, ASPRI’s case 
study shows how neoliberal reforms use this politically ambiguous 
fused discourse to incorporate socially committed organizations, such 
as development nonprofits, to their new form of governance. 
ASPRI became a contested site in which political parties tried to 
exercise control of federal funds designated for impoverished popu-
lations. This susceptibility to political interests questions the notion 
that nonprofit organizations represent an associational field “of struc-
tured citizen action outside the boundaries of the market and the state” 
(Salamon, 2002, p. 11).  Contrary to this oppositional view, ASPRI’s 
history exposed how some nonprofits lie within the political sphere of 
local parties and even serve partisan interests 
The neoliberal preference for contracting with nonprofits is jus-
tified on the grounds that these organizations constitute a “do-good 
sector sustained by volunteers and unencumbered and untainted by the 
politics of government or the greed of the market” (Fisher, 1997, p. 
442).  ASPRI’s regretful corruption scandal and strict submission to 
CSBG’s administrative demands and evaluation tools undermine its 
“do good” image and questions its viability as a suitable alternative to 
the much vilified Puerto Rican state. Finally, ASPRI’s case study is not 
presented as being representative of the nonprofit sector as a whole. 
However, the lessons learned complicate the uncritical discourse en-
gulfing nonprofits in the island. ASPRI’s analysis substantiates the call 
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for greater empirical research on the nonprofit sector in order specify 
which organizations are “doing good” and which ones are “just as bad” 
as the neoliberal state.
1. The literature reviewed for this essay uses the terms 
nongovernmental, nonprofit and third sector in a somewhat 
overlapping fashion to refer to a sphere of action lying pur-
portedly outside of the state and the market. I use the term 
nonprofit (sin fines de lucro) due to its more common usage 
in Puerto Rico. Camacho Hernandez (2009) offers a clear dis-
cussion of the overlaps and differences of these terms.  
2. I use ASPRI, the Spanish acronym for Acción Social 
de Puerto Rico, Inc. Grassroots support organizations are de-
velopment-oriented nonprofits that serve as intermediaries 
between public and private resources and impoverished com-
munities.
4. Block grants are “fixed-sum federal grants to state and 
local governments that give them broad flexibility to design 
and implement designated programs” (Finegold, Wherry, & 
Schardin, 2004, p.1).
5. Some states and local governments like Puerto Rico 
established public community action agencies and/or local 
Economic Opportunity Offices which made them recipients 
of EOA funds.
6. CAAs are mandated by the Green Amendment of 1968 
to establish a tri-partite board consisting of elected public of-
ficials, representatives of their client population, and private 
sector leaders, including businessmen, leaders of faith-based 
groups and civic leaders. 
7. Personal interview, February 12, 2009. 
8. The remaining funds go to the municipalities of San 
Juan (15%) and Bayamón (14%).
9. Community action agencies cover a county or city that 
is not serviced by another CAAS.
10. The consortiums have at least one PNP municipality.
11. ASPRI’s financial information was retrieved from the 
990 form submitted to the IRS for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. 
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